Competitive ride-sourcing markets with a third-party integrator

时间:2021-01-04         阅读:


主题Competitive ride-sourcing markets with a third-party integrator

主讲人香港科技大学 杨海教授

主持人工商管理学院 肖峰教授


直播平台及会议ID腾讯会议会议ID:830 319 414

主办单位:工商管理学院 科研处


Prof. Hai Yang is currently a Chair Professor at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He is internationally known as an active scholar in the field of transportation, with more than 260 papers published in SCI/SSCI indexed journals and a SCI H-index citation rate of 60. Most of his publications appeared in leading international journals, such as Transportation Research, Transportation Science and Operations Research. Prof. Yang received a number of national and international awards, including Frank M. Masters Transportation Engineering Award, American Society of Civil Engineers (2020); National Natural Science Award bestowed by the State Council of PR China (2011). He was appointed as Chang Jiang Chair Professor of the Ministry of Education of PR China; Prof. Yang served as the Editor-in-Chief of Transportation Research Part B: Methodological from 2013 to 2018 and is now a distinguished editorial board member of this prestigious journal.

杨海教授,香港科技大学讲座教授,国际交通领域知名学者,发表SCI/SSCI论文超过260篇,SCI H-index指数60。其中大多数成果发表在Transportation Research,Transportation Science和Operations Research等国际顶级期刊上。杨教授曾获国内外诸多奖项,包括2020年ASCE运输工程奖章、2011年国家自然科学奖等,曾任教育部长江学者讲座教授,并在2013-2018年担任《Transportation Research Part B: Methodological》主编,现为该期刊杰出编辑委员会成员。


With the rapid development of shared mobility, third-party integrators have emerged recently to integrate competitive platforms that offer on-demand ride services in ride-sourcing markets. With platform integration, a passenger can request a ride through the integrator and can be matched with an idle driver affiliated to any of the integrated platforms, whichever is first or closer. As a result, passengers can access a higher level of supply, generating a thicker market with shorter average matching and pickup times. More importantly, platform integration maintains a competitive environment in which the participating platforms still set their prices, wages, and other operating strategies independently. In this talk, mathematical models are described to characterize the Nash equilibrium of the ride-sourcing market with multiple competing platforms and compare market outcomes with and without platform-integration. It is found that platform-integration can increase total realized demand and social welfare but may not necessarily generate a greater profit when vehicle supply is sufficiently large or/and market is too fragmented.